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This paper examines the major developments in WTO dispute settlement during three time periods 
(1995-1999, 2000-2004, 2005-2012) and considers the effectiveness of the system in restraining the 
use of trade measures by the United States and the European Union. It finds that the first period was 
characterized by the large number of cases brought by the United States and the European Union and 
that the second and third periods were noteworthy for the increased number of cases brought by 
developing countries and by the numerous cases brought against the United States. On the question of 
effectiveness, the paper finds that the system has succeeded in restraining the use of WTO-inconsistent 
trade measures by the United States and the European Union, but often only after considerable delays 
in implementation of DSB rulings. 
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 1 
The WTO dispute settlement system has now been in operation for 18 years. In this working paper, I 
review the major developments over its short life – focusing on what I view as the most salient aspects 
of its record during three periods: the first five years; the second five years; and the last eight years. 
For me, each of these periods evidences distinct developments in the evolution of the system. 
Thereafter, I consider how promptly and faithfully the decisions of the panels and Appellate Body 
have been implemented by the major players in the WTO – the United States and the European Union. 
I. Major Developments in the Operation of WTO Dispute Settlement System1 
A. The First Five Years (1995-1999) 
The first five years of WTO dispute settlement were noteworthy for the heavy usage made of the 
system, the large number of controversial cases and issues carried over from the GATT days and the 
flowering of the Appellate Body. 
1. Heavy Usage 
From 1995 through 1999, the WTO dispute settlement system was characterized by extensive use of 
the system by the United States initially, and later by the European Union.2 While there was a wide 
range of disputes, this period was especially notable for carryover cases from the days of GATT and a 
focus on implementation of Uruguay Round results, particularly in respect of the TRIPS Agreement. 
There were 185 consultation requests made from 1995 through 1999, or 37 per year.3 The United 
States initiated 60 consultation requests, or about one-third of the disputes. Indeed, in the first three 
years, the United States initiated 35% of the consultation requests made. During the first five years, 
the European Union initiated 47 consultation requests, also about one-third of the disputes. 
Interestingly, the European Union initiated 31% of the consultation requests in the last three years of 
the period (1997–1999), compared to only 11% in the first two years of the period (1995–1996). Of 
the other WTO members, Canada was also relatively active in the first two years, initiating 8 
consultation requests (12.5%). 
2. Controversial Carry-Over Cases 
Probably the most noteworthy characteristic of WTO dispute settlement in its early years was the large 
number of very controversial cases involving systemic issues or specific fact situations that were 
carried over from the GATT system. Examples would include the EC Bananas III case, the EC 
Hormones case, the Japan Film case, the US Shrimp case, the US Helms-Burton case, the Turkey 
Textiles case, the India Quantitative Restrictions case, the US Section 301 case and, in a matter 
decided just after the end of the period, the US FSC case.
4
 These cases all involved the United States 
and/or European Union and raised very sensitive and controversial issues. Except for the Bananas and 
the FSC cases, the disputes did not directly involve great amounts of trade, but they were nonetheless 
                                                     
1
 The discussion of the first ten years is taken from William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten 
Years, 8 Journal of International Economic Law 17, 17-25 (2005). 
2
 I use the term “European Union” or “EU” throughout this paper, notwithstanding the fact that during much of the WTO’s 
existence, the “European Community(ies)” or “EC” was the official name of the party to the WTO Agreement. 
3
 This information is available from the WTO website: www.wto.org. Some of these requests involved the same 
underlying dispute. For example, there were two underlying consultation requests in the first WTO case resulting in a 
panel report (US Gasoline) and three consultations in the second (Japan Alcohol Taxes II). For simplicity, I have not tried 
here to group related consultations requests, although I have done so elsewhere. See id. 
4
 For a brief description of these cases, see Annex I. 
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considered very important for symbolic reasons. Fortunately for the system, it managed to defuse these 
cases—the United States lost the Film case and the European Union lost the Section 301 case and 
neither appealed, perhaps because in each case the losing party won some useful points; the Helms-
Burton case was informally settled on the day the first written submission was due to be received by 
the panel. The Turkey Textiles and India QR cases disturbed some members for systemic reasons, but 
the actual results of the cases did not result in serious implementation difficulties for either respondent 
nor has the systemic issue arisen again. In Shrimp, the United States lost, but while the case was 
controversial, the Appellate Body report was welcomed by many as making the WTO more 
environmentally friendly and the United States had no problem implementing the report. The Bananas 
case presented the most difficult implementation problem because of a United States–European Union 
dispute over how to interpret the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding. Indeed, that dispute came 
close to destroying the system in its relative infancy, but it was ultimately finessed,
5
 and an agreement 
on implementation was reached in 2001. That agreement failed, but the case was formally settled in 
2012.
6
 Of this early group of cases, only Bananas, Hormones and FSC remained unimplemented for 
substantial periods of time and all were subject to the imposition of retaliatory measures. The United 
States ultimately implemented the FSC decision in 2005 and the United States settled the Hormones 
case in 2009 by accepting increased access to the EU beef market.
7
 Overall, the WTO dispute 
settlement system seemed to survive these controversial cases reasonably well, although it must be 
conceded that some of the WTO Members directly involved in the specific cases were somewhat 
embittered at certain results. 
3. The Appellate Body 
The most noteworthy single development in the first five years of WTO dispute settlement was the 
flowering of the Appellate Body. The role it would play in the WTO system was quickly put to the test 
as the first 12 panel reports were appealed. From the outset, the Appellate Body established itself as an 
activist tribunal. It modified 10 of the reports, effectively reversing one of them. In its review of panel 
reports, the Appellate Body did not focus on whether it approved of the result in general terms as some 
appellate tribunals do, but rather it closely examined the reasoning and wording of the panel reports, 
and it did not hesitate to modify reasoning or wording with which it disagreed. 
                                                     
5
 In the Bananas case, the United States requested the WTO Dispute Settlement Body to authorize it to suspend 
concessions under DSU article 22 on the grounds that the European Union had failed to implement the DSB 
recommendations in the case. The European Union argued that since it had implemented and that since there was a 
dispute over whether its implementing measure was consistent with WTO rules, there had to be a determination under 
DSU article 21.5 that its implementation measure was WTO inconsistent before suspension of concessions could be 
authorized. The United States responded that DSU article 22 did not impose such a condition and that, as a practical 
matter, it would lose the right to have suspension of concessions approved by reverse consensus if its request were not 
acted upon within 30 days of the expiration of the reasonable period of time. In that regard, it noted that an article 21.5 
panel would never be able to issue its report within such a timeframe. Ultimately, after a week-long DSB meeting and 
much controversy (e.g., several suspensions of the meeting and a challenge to a ruling by the chair, including a call for a 
vote to overrule the chair), the US request was ruled to be in order. The European Union then requested arbitration under 
DSU article 22.6 to determine the level of suspension. Under the DSU, the arbitrators were the members of the original 
panel, who were contemporaneously conducting an article 21.5 proceeding brought a few weeks earlier by Ecuador (one 
of the original complainants with the United States). The panel/arbitrators simultaneously ruled in both matters that the 
EU implementing measures were not WTO-consistent and in the arbitration set the level of suspension at a level 
considerably below the US request. At the time, it was unclear (i) what the United States would do if its request had not 
been ruled to be in order (although it was assumed that it would take retaliatory measures unilaterally, as it later did when 
it decided that the arbitration was taking too long) and (ii) once the request was ruled to be in order, whether the 
European Union would press its demand for a DSB vote to overrule the chair, ask for arbitration or take other action. The 
Secretariat had been urging the parties to go to arbitration with an agreed timetable. In the end, the EU request effectively 
implemented the Secretariat approach, but without an agreed timetable. See WT/DSB/M/54. 
6
 See Annex III. 
7
 See Annexes II (FSC) & III (Hormones). 
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The first appeal (US Gasoline) was noteworthy in that the Appellate Body stressed the need to 
focus on the exact words of the relevant treaty text and to apply the rules of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties in order to interpret the WTO agreements. Moreover, in that appeal, which 
involved a successful challenge by Venezuela and Brazil of a US environmental measure, the 
Appellate Body first evinced a concern with ensuring that governments have adequate discretion to 
take what they view as necessary environmental measures, assuming of course that they meet GATT's 
nondiscrimination requirements. Thus, while the US failed to convince the Appellate Body that it met 
those requirements, it did obtain a decision that it considered to be more environmental-friendly. 
The role of the Appellate Body in handling the six controversial cases discussed above that were 
appealed is quite instructive. The six cases involved commercial issues (Bananas and FSC), 
institutional issues (India QR and Turkey Textiles) and environmental/health issues (Hormones and 
Shrimp). In the cases involving commercial issues, the Appellate Body applied the rules relatively 
strictly. Indeed, in the Bananas case, the panel had ruled in the EU's favor on one of the two major 
issues in the case by interpreting a waiver obtained by the EU that explicitly permitted banana tariff 
preferences as also covering quota preferences. The Appellate Body—emphasizing the text of the 
waiver—reversed that part of the panel report. In the two institutional cases, the Appellate Body took a 
broad view of the jurisdiction of the WTO dispute settlement system—effectively ruling that it was 
competent to consider the justification of balance-of-payments measures and to decide on whether a 
free trade area or customs union was consistent with GATT Article XXIV. 
In contrast, in the two environmental/health cases, the Appellate Body reports interpreted the 
relevant agreements so as to increase governmental discretion. In the Hormones case, the Appellate 
Body made a number of statements suggesting that the SPS Agreement should be interpreted so as to 
afford discretion to governments, such as by invoking the in dubio mitius principle and noting that 
although SPS measures are to be science-based, governments were not required to follow mainstream 
scientific opinion. In the Shrimp case, it built upon the Gasoline case in giving breadth to the 
exception in GATT Article XX(g) for measures related to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources. While it ultimately did not reverse the panels' findings of violations in the two cases, its 
criticisms of the strict approach taken by the panels, as well as the general tone and some of the 
specific language in its reports, were welcomed by those concerned that trade rules not override 
environmental measures. 
Although the number of trade remedy and subsidy cases was relatively small compared to later 
years,
8
 the Appellate Body established in this period that it would generally find fault with trade 
remedies imposed and subsidies provided by WTO members. 
4. Summary 
The WTO dispute settlement system survived its first five years in good shape. It was used frequently 
by WTO members and it had successfully handled a number of very controversial cases. While 
members had complaints about individual cases, they all stated their general satisfaction with the 
system in the course of the 1998–1999 DSU review in which it was agreed that only some fine-tuning 
of the system was needed. 
B. The Second Five Years (2000–2004) 
The second five years of WTO dispute settlement were noteworthy for a moderate decline in usage of 
the system; a sharp increase in developing country usage of the system; and the evolution of the role of 
the United States in the WTO dispute settlement system from principal complainant to principal target. 
In addition, it was noteworthy that the second five years saw a significant increase in the number of 
                                                     
8
 See discussion in text at note 11 infra. 
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trade remedy cases involving safeguards, dumping and subsidies. As noted above, trade remedy cases 
had been relatively rare in the initial years of dispute settlement. 
1. Usage Moderates 
The second five years of the WTO dispute settlement system were marked by a noticeable decline in 
consultation requests—a total of 139 requests, or 28 requests per year, as opposed to 37 requests per 
year in the first five years. In other words, usage declined by roughly 25%. More significantly, the 
United States and the European Union no longer were as dominant as complainants in the system. In 
the 2000–2004 period, the United States filed 20 consultation requests (14% of the requests), as did 
the European Union.  
2. Advanced Developing Countries Discover WTO Dispute Settlement 
In contrast, developing country use of the system increased dramatically. Indeed, it is striking to 
consider the evolution in the use of the WTO dispute settlement system by developing countries, 
particularly advanced developing countries. In the first five years of the system's existence, developing 
countries initiated by themselves roughly one-quarter of the consultation requests. In the 2000-2004 
period, developing countries initiated over one-half of the consultation requests—more than doubling 
their relative share of initiations. Brazil was particularly active, initiating 9 consultation requests. 
Thus, developing countries became more frequent users of WTO dispute settlement, both in absolute 
and relative terms. Interestingly, the majority of those cases have involved developing country 
respondents. That is to say, developing countries seem to have found the WTO dispute settlement 
system to be a useful mechanism to deal with a wide range of trade disputes—using it not only against 
developed countries, but also in their trading relations with other developing countries. Of particular 
note is the way in which Latin American countries have made extensive use of the system in their 
dealings with other. The importance of this development cannot be over-emphasized because it has 
been argued since the beginning of the WTO that the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is too 
complicated for developing countries to make effective use of.  
3. The United States as Principal Target of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports 
In the first five years of dispute settlement, the United States and the European Union were each the 
respondent in four reports issued by the Appellate Body (16% each of total reports), while the rest of 
the WTO membership were respondents in 17 such reports.
9
 In the second five years of WTO dispute 
settlement, the United States was the respondent in 20 out of 38 Appellate Body reports circulated 
(53%), while the European Union was a respondent in six and the rest of the membership were 
respondents in 13.
10
 As we will see, this trend continues to the present. For reference, it is worth 
noting that in the first decade only Canada, which was the respondent in eight cases, was a respondent 
in more than three Appellate Body reports. 
                                                     
9
 I use Appellate Body reports exclusively for this metric. Generally, I think that the cases appealed to the Appellate Body 
are the more important cases. However, if unappealed panel reports are included in the calculations, the numbers for the 
first five years would be: United States: 7/33 (21%); European Union 5/33 (15%); others: 21/33 (64%). For the second 
five years (2000-2004): United States: 28/60 (47%); European Union: 6/60 (10%); others: 26/60 (43%). As these 
numbers suggest, respondents other than the United States and the European Union appeal less often on average than do 
the United States and the European Union. In any event, the basic trend is still apparent – the United States has become 
by far the major target of WTO complaints that are pursued through the dispute settlement process. 
10
 I did not count the India Autos report since the appeal was withdrawn and report was only a few pages in length. 
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4. Trade Remedies and Subsidies 
In the first years of WTO dispute settlement, subsidy and trade remedies cases were not that 
common.
11
 That changed dramatically in the second five year period from 2000-2004. Of the 20 
Appellate Body cases involving the United States in that period, seventeen were subsidy or trade 
remedy cases, as were six of the 18 cases involving other WTO members. Thus, in total, subsidy and 
trade remedy cases made up 26 of the 38 cases, or two-thirds of the cases. 
5. Summary 
The second five-year period saw the WTO dispute settlement system become in large part a 
mechanism for challenging US trade remedies and subsidies. Of the cases reaching the Appellate 
Body, 17 of 38 fell into this category (45%). Among its other cases, the most notable were EC 
Asbestos, EC Tariff Preferences and Korea Beef. Generally, the Appellate Body continued to find fault 
with WTO member decisions imposing trade remedies or providing subsidies. Its approach in other 
cases continued as commented on earlier – deference was given in the health case (Asbestos), but not 
in the commercial case (Beef).
12
  
C. The Next Eight Years (2005-2012) 
The major developments of the next eight years through 2012 were the continuing decline in 
consultation requests (although China became an active complainant); that the United States remained 
by far the main target of complaints (as it had been in the second period), especially in respect of 
challenges to its use of “zeroing”; and the inability of the Appellate Body to deal with its caseload in 
the prompt manner WTO members had come to expect. 
1. Usage Declines Further and China Becomes an Active Complainant 
The next eight years of the WTO dispute settlement system (2005-2012) were marked by a significant 
decline in consultation requests—a total of 130 requests, or 16 requests per year, as opposed to 37 
requests per year in the first five years and 28 requests per year in the second. In other words, usage 
declined by roughly 40% compared to the second five year period and almost 60% compared to the 
first. As in the second period, the United States and the European Union easily remained the most 
frequent complainants in the system, although they were not as dominant as in the first period. In the 
2005–2012 period, the United States filed 23 consultation requests (18% of the requests), and the 
European Union filed 19 (15%). Interestingly, China became the third most frequent complainant (tied 
with Mexico) with 10 requests (8%). All told, 30 WTO members filed consultation requests during the 
period, including 12 Latin American countries. China’s complainants were all directed at US (seven 
requests) or EU (three requests) actions, and those two launched numerous complaints against China 
as well – fourteen by the United States and six by the European Union. Indeed, the future success of 
the WTO dispute settlement system may well turn on whether it can successfully deal with these 
disputes. 
                                                     
11
 There were two special textiles safeguard cases (US Wool Shirts and US Underwear), two regular safeguard cases (Korea 
Dairy and Argentina Footwear), two subsidy cases (Brazil Air and Canada Air), one dumping case (Guatemala Cement) 
and one countervail case (Brazil Coconuts), or only eight out of 25 cases – less than one-third. (One other case involved, 
inter alia, the interpretation of the special agricultural safeguard (EC – Poultry)). 
12
 It is worth noting that, after Hormones, deference in health cases was limited to those interpreting GATT Article XX(b), 
as virtually all SPS measures challenged have been found deficient under the SPS Agreement. 
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2. The United States as Target and “Zeroing” as the Issue 
In the most recent eight years of WTO dispute settlement (2005-2012), the United States was the 
respondent in 24 out of 44 Appellate Body reports circulated (55%), while the European Union was a 
respondent in six (14%) and the rest of the membership were respondents in 14 (32%).
13
 Thus, the 
pattern remained essentially the same as in the second five-year period, with the exception that China 
became a more common respondent before the Appellate Body (4 cases in the 2008-2012 period).
14 
Part of the reason that the United States had become a frequent target of complaints was its 
continuation of zeroing in antidumping cases. Of the 24 Appellate Body cases involving the United 
States as a respondent during the period, eight of them (33%) concerned zeroing as the main issue, 
while another six (25%) involved other challenges to US trade remedy actions, while four involved US 
subsidies (17%), or 75 percent in total.
15
 Although the zeroing issue seems to have been settled at the 
time of this writing (early 2013) as the United States has agreed to stop zeroing in regular cases, it may 
well reappear as there may be an exception in the Antidumping Agreement that would allow zeroing 
in cases of “targeted dumping”, something that is apparently now commonly alleged in US and EU 
antidumping petitions. The Appellate Body’s treatment of the zeroing issue has been very 
unsatisfactory in the eyes of the United States, which believes that the Appellate Body’s zeroing 
decisions are not consistent with what was negotiated in the Uruguay Round and are not soundly 
reasoned. At the time the Uruguay Round implementing legislation was drafted, it was the view of the 
United States that it had to forego simple zeroing in investigations, but that it was permitted to 
continue to zero in annual reviews.
16
 Thus, the Appellate Body's failure to analyze or give any weight 
to the words "during the investigation phase" in article 2.4.2 of the Antidumping Agreement upsets the 
United States, especially since the Appellate Body has held that the de minimis rules of Article 11.9 of 
the SCM Agreement (similar to Article 5.8 of the Antidumping Agreement) apply only to 
investigations and not reviews. More generally, the current view of the Appellate Body on zeroing 
seems grounded in its view of the definition of "dumping" and "margins of dumping" in GATT Article 
VI, which suggests that zeroing has always been a GATT violation, notwithstanding the fact that it has 
long been the subject of negotiations. In addition, the Appellate Body's conclusion that zeroing 
violates the "fair comparison" language of article 2.4 would seem to make article 2.4.2 mostly 
superfluous. In any event, its zeroing decisions are the only ones that panels have ever flatly rejected 
(to little effect in the end, of course). 
3. The Appellate Body Overwhelmed 
In the last few years prior to this writing, the Appellate Body seemed overwhelmed by its caseload 
and, in particular, the need to deal with the so-called Boeing-Airbus disputes, which resulted in reports 
of 369 and 399 substantive pages and took many months to process. These two cases so disrupted the 
Appellate Body’s work that a number of other appeals were delayed as well. While no one would 
question that the two aircraft subsidy cases were massive, one can ask whether an Appellate Body of 
seven should be so disrupted by two cases over two years, each of which is dealt with by only three 
members, leaving four others to handle the remaining cases, which amounted to four cases per year. 
If one looks at the Appellate Body reports over time, they seem to have become longer and longer, 
although it is not clear to me that the typical cases have become all that much more complex. In the 
                                                     
13
 I have counted the Continued Suspension case as one case, involving the United States; I realize that there was a second 
report dealing with Canada, but the reports are basically the same. 
14
 If unappealed panel reports are included, the totals would be United States (33 of 71, or 46%); European Union (13 of 71, 
or 18%); the rest (26 of 71, or 37%). 
15
 Of the cases involving respondents other than the United States, only five of 21 involved such cases. 
16
 See Ways & Means Memo on AD/CVD Provisions, May 24, 1994, in Special Report, Inside US Trade, June 3, 1994. 
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first five year period of WTO dispute settlement, the Appellate Body issued 25 reports (six
17
 per year) 
and the substantive portion of reports had a median length of 22 pages , while in the second five year 
period, it issued 39 reports (almost eight per year) and the median length of the substantive section 
was 41 pages. In the most recent eight years, however, it issued 43 reports (five and one-half per year) 
and the median length of the substantive part of the reports was 63 pages. Excluding the four 200 page 
and over reports, would have lowered the median, but only to 58 pages. Thus, there has been a steady 
progression towards longer and longer reports. 
One thing that has changed, however, is the style of Appellate Body reports. They seem more 
institutional in style than did the early reports. Given that the length of the reports started to grow 
about a year after there was a significant in personnel in the Appellate Body Secretariat – the staff 
went from nine in 2000 to 13 in 2001 – one cannot help but wonder whether more staff producing 
more memoranda has led to more material being incorporated into the reports, which probably 
complicates the process somewhat and may explain part of the difficulty the Appellate Body has faced 
in meeting its time limits in recent years. 
4. Summary 
In general, the most recent eight years have not differed so much from the 2000-2004 period. The 
United States remained the main respondent in the Appellate Body and most of the cases continued to 
concern subsidies and trade remedies. While panels and the Appellate Body were busy, one has to be 
concerned that the decline in consultation requests may indication some degree of dissatisfaction with 
the system and the delays in getting final results.
18
 That concern is moderated by the fact that there 
was a sharp increase in consultation requests in 2012 (27 requests were filed, twice the average of 13 
per year in the preceding three years). As to the output during this period, probably the most 
significant Appellate Body cases were the three 2012 TBT cases, two aircraft subsidy cases, the cotton 
subsidy case and the Brazil Tyres case. The TBT cases presented the most interesting issues and were 
the Appellate Body’s most innovative reports. How the cases will be ultimately resolved remains 
unclear; they all involve the United States, which needs to revise the measures challenged in the 
course of 2013. In respect of the US Clove Cigarettes case, that may difficult for the United States to 
do. If so, the decision of the Appellate Body to strike down an anti-tobacco measure may stir-up 
considerable controversy, although could be moderated if it upholds the Australian tobacco plain-
packaging law, which will probably reach the Appellate Body in 2014. 
II. Implementation of Panel and Appellate Body Reports 
The ultimate goal of the WTO dispute settlement system is to resolve disputes between WTO 
members. How effectively has it performed this critical function? In some respects, this is a difficult 
question to answer because, inter alia, (i) publicly available information about the ultimate outcomes 
of some disputes is simply not available; (ii) some complainants win but may not receive much 
practical benefit from their victory or may end up accepting less than full vindication of their rights; 
(iii) some disputes are resolved, but only after a very long time; and (iv) some disputes are never 
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 The Appellate Body had no members until the very end of 1995, so I divided the total number of reports by four rather 
than five. 
18
 In this regard, the time taken by the panel process has greatly exceeded the timeframes established in the DSU (far more 
than the Appellate Body, which has had problems only in the last couple of years) and the frequent recourse to 
compliance proceedings under DSU article 21.5 mean that it takes years to resolve some disputes. I discuss the timeliness 
problem in William J. Davey, Expediting the Panel Process in WTO Dispute Settlement, in Merit E. Janow, Victoria 
Donaldson & Alan Yanovich (eds.), The WTO: Governance, Dispute Settlement and Developing Countries 409-470 
(New York: Juris Publishing, 2008). 
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resolved, but appear to be of little significance. In this section, I will consider the overall picture first 
and then focus on how the United States and the European Union have performed in implementation. 
A. Overall Implementation 
Based on several studies of the outcomes of WTO disputes,
19
 the following conclusions can be drawn. 
First, it appears that roughly one-half of the consultation requests are effectively settled. While this 
degree of settlement is not reflected in notifications of mutually agreed solutions to the DSB under 
DSU Article 3(6), further research and conversations with participants reveals that (i) some cases are 
settled but the parties for whatever reason choose not to notify the settlement; (ii) other cases are 
settled during the panel process; (iii) some cases involve measures that are never enacted or are 
modified or withdrawn, thus removing the basis for the dispute; and (iv) some cases are effectively 
abandoned because they are seen as not having a sufficient legal or factual basis, seek results that are 
thought to be more likely achievable in negotiations or for some other reason (e.g., a merger of the two 
companies that were on opposite sides of the dispute).  
Second, of those cases that result in adopted panel/Appellate Body reports, the studies found that 
over 80 per cent had been implemented within the period examined – about one-half within the 
reasonable period of time set for implementation and, in respect of the rest, the amount of time that 
elapses between the due date for implementation and actual implementation varies from a few weeks 
to many years. However, in the long run, almost all reports are eventually implemented, although a 
few relatively insignificant cases have remained on the DSB’s surveillance agenda for many years. 
Examples of cases that took a particularly long time to resolve include EC Bananas, EC Hormones, 
US FSC, US Byrd Amendment, the various Lumber cases brought by Canada against the US and the 
various US Zeroing cases. The first four cases are the only ones to date where retaliatory measures 
have been imposed. 
Third, implementation may sometimes bring only limited benefits to the complaining member. For 
example, several safeguard measures have been successfully challenged in WTO dispute settlement, 
but given the time taken by the panel and appellate process and the reasonable period of time set for 
implementation, the safeguard will have been in force for as many as three years before it is required 
to be removed. Thus, the respondent will have achieved its policy goal and suffered no consequence 
(beyond reputation) for violating the Safeguards Agreement. Similarly, in antidumping cases, the 
respondent may be required to reconsider the dumping or injury issue because its original 
determinations violated the Antidumping Agreement, but in many cases, the reconsideration does not 
lead to a significantly different antidumping duty being imposed.  
Nonetheless, overall I think that the WTO dispute settlement system has to be judged a major 
success. It has dealt successfully with many controversial cases, particularly between major powers 
such as the United States and the European Union. While the timeliness of compliance with rulings 
has been a problem in some cases, the key fact is that compliance generally occurs, even if the benefits 
are less than might have been anticipated. It is instructive, however, to consider the record of the 
United States and the European Union in this regard, as more information is available on their 
compliance action. 
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B. Implementation by the United States of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports 
The United States has lost 48 cases in the WTO dispute settlement system. To assess its 
implementation record it is useful to subdivide the cases into six categories: safeguards; subsidies; 
TRIPS; health, environment and consumer protection; dumping and countervail cases; and other cases. 
This has been done in Annex II, which indicates on a case-by-case basis, the date the report was 
adopted, the date implementation was due, an explanation of the implementation action and the time at 
which it occurred, and the time period, if any, by which the date of implementation exceeded the 
original due date. Where applicable, dates of adoption of compliance reports under DSU article 21.5 
and of subsequent implementation actions are also indicated. 
1. Safeguards 
As shown in Annex II, the United States has an excellent record in implementing the results of the 
seven safeguard cases where its use of the safeguard was found to be inconsistent with the relevant 
WTO agreement. All of the challenged measures were removed by the end of the reasonable period of 
time for implementation, except in the case of the Line Pipe safeguard, where the complainant was 
compensated for the implementation delay of six months. Of course, the trade impact of the safeguards 
at issue was often felt for several years. Nonetheless, technical compliance was achieved. 
2. Subsidies 
The United States has been involved in three subsidy cases where it has been found to have violated 
the WTO Subsidies Agreement. In all three cases there were subsequent article 21.5 proceedings (and 
in the FSC case – two article 21.5 proceedings). In these cases, the compliance record is more 
complicated. In FSC, the initial implementation measures had clear WTO-consistency problems, as 
panels found. Thus, one can wonder if implementation was completely in good faith. In any event, the 
FSC case was implemented, with an overall delay of a little over six years. In Cotton, there was partial 
implementation, but the article 21.5 implementation found that implementation was not complete. At 
this point, implementation is more than seven years overdue and that status is continuing. However, 
Brazil has accepted compensation for the time being, so the United States is in a way meeting its 
current obligations. The third subsidy case – Civil Aircraft – is in an ongoing article 21.5 proceeding 
that will likely drag on for several years. Overall, the US record on implementation in subsidy cases is 
not so great. 
3. TRIPS 
The United States has lost two TRIPS cases – Section 110(5) and Section 211. In both cases, the 
congressional action necessary to implement has not occurred despite the passage of much time – 
eleven years in Section 110(5) (although compensation was provided for three years) and seven and 
one half years in the Section 211 case. The US implementation record in these cases can only be 
described as completely unsatisfactory, although it is worth noting that the commercial importance of 
the cases is fairly small. 
4. Health, environment and consumer protection cases 
The United States has been on the losing end of five health, environment and consumer protection 
cases, but three of the cases were from 2012 and the reasonable periods of time for implementation 
have not yet expired. In the other two cases, the United States implemented in a timely manner in one 
case (Shrimp), and was only a few months late in the other (Gasoline). Thus, for the moment, it has a 
good record in this category. 
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5. Antidumping and countervail cases 
The United States has lost 28 antidumping or countervail cases, that is, more than half of the cases that 
it has lost fall into this category. The US record in implementing these losses is not so good. However, 
some insight can be gained if the losses are subdivided into three groups: the Lumber cases, the 
contested Zeroing cases
20
 and the rest. 
Of the four Lumber cases, one involved a measure that had expired prior to adoption of the panel 
report and in one case the Canadian challenge to US implementation failed (although there was not 
actually a finding that the United States had implemented). The Lumber cases were ultimately settled 
on a global basis and that occurred one year and nine months after implementation was due in one case 
and one year and four months after it was due in the other. 
Of the six contested Zeroing cases, three were settled, but the settlement occurred years after 
compliance was due. Indeed, it occurred more than two years after the United States lost two article 
21.5 proceedings in the cases. Three other cases have not yet been formally settled (the outstanding 
issue in at least two of the cases is what to do about past uses of zeroing, as the antidumping orders in 
the cases have been revoked; in the third case there are non-market economy issues as well), so the 
period of non-compliance continues to grow. It is almost four years in one case and is approaching one 
year in the other two cases. 
Of the other 18 cases, the reasonable period of time has not yet expired in one. Of the remaining 17 
cases, compliance was achieved within the reasonable period of time in eight cases. In three cases, 
implementation occurred within a year of the expiration of the reasonable period of time for 
implementation. In the other six cases, implementation did not occur until more than a year had passed 
after the expiration of the reasonable period of time for implementation. 
To summarize the overall situation in the antidumping and countervail area, the following table 
indicates the number of reports implemented within the reasonable period of time, the number that 
were not more than six months late, the number that were between six and twelve months late and the 
number that were implemented more than a year late. 
 
Implementation in US Antidumping and 
Countervail Cases 
Timely implementation 10 
0-6 months late 2 
6-12 months late 3 
More than one year late 12 
Altogether five cases are currently overdue for implementation: the three zeroing cases, the Byrd 
Amendment case and the Hot-Rolled Steel case. In Byrd, smaller and smaller distributions are being 
made over time since only duties collected prior to October 2007 are eligible. As noted, the United 
States has stopped zeroing (except in targeted dumping cases), so those three cases will presumably 
fade away at some point. The challenged antidumping measure in Hot-Rolled Steel was revised and 
compliance was accepted, but the required statutory change has never been made. 
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6. Other cases 
The United States has lost three other cases that are not easily categorizable. One case involved its 
“premature” retaliation against European Union in the Bananas case, but the challenged measure was 
only in force for a very short time and long since expired by the time the case was completed. A 
second case involved a discriminatory measure aimed at China (a prohibition of spending money 
needed to remove China from an SPS measure), which had also expired before the proceeding had 
been completed. [This was found to be an SPS measure, but even if it was technically, it has little in 
common with other health cases.] Finally, the United States lost one GATS case – Gambling, where 
non-compliance has lasted almost seven years and is continuing. This case is also somewhat unusual 
in that the challenged measure concern a GATS commitment that the United States has since 
renegotiated with all other interested WTO members except the complainant (Antigua). 
7. Summary 
The overall record for the United States is indicated in the following table: 
 
US Implementation In All WTO Cases 
Where RPT Has Expired 
Timely implementation 20 
0-6 months late 3 
6-12 months late 3 
More than one year late 17 
There are currently nine cases where implementation is due and has not occurred: the three zeroing 
cases, the Byrd Amendment case and the Hot-Rolled Steel case (mentioned above), plus the two TRIPS 
cases, the Gambling case and the Cotton case. With the exception of the Cotton case, where the United 
States is paying compensation to Brazil, the remaining issues in these cases are generally fairly minor 
in commercial terms. 
In summary, the United States generally complies, but not promptly. Compliance has been overdue 
by more than a year in one-half of the cases that the United States lost. This record undoubtedly 
undermines the WTO system by making tardy compliance a standard practice, but the fact that 
compliance usually occurs in the significant cases is positive in the sense that the world’s leading 
economic power eventually accepts rules-based dispute settlement. Moreover, the principal cases of 
non-compliance are due to a failure of Congress to act (all except the zeroing cases), which suggests 
the US administrations have continued to act responsibly towards the WTO. 
C. Implementation by the European Union of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports 
An analysis of the compliance record of the European Union is much simpler than that concerning the 
US record, as indicated in the table below. The European Union has lost 19 cases (18 if the two 
Hormones cases are counted as one, as they will be hereafter). Of those 18 cases, compliance is being 
challenged in one case. In the other 17 cases, as indicated in Annex III, the European Union has 
complied in a timely fashion in 13 cases. While full compliance has been question in a number of 
these cases, no further proceeding have been initiated, and only in the Sugar case have the 
complainants continued to raise compliance questions over time. There have been four problematic 
cases. Probably the most noteworthy case, and one that is quite significant commercially, is the 
Bananas case, which was recently settled (apparently definitively) after almost 14 years of non-
compliance. The second most notorious case of EU non-compliance is the Hormones case, where the 
European Union has claimed that it is in compliance, but has been unable to prevail in a panel 
proceeding to that effect – its challenge to US and Canadian sanctions ended without a definitive 
determination. It has, however, settled with both of those parties thus effectively ending the case some 
William J. Davey 
12 
10 to 12 years after the expiration of the reasonable period of time for implementation. The third case 
of EU non-compliance involves the Biotech case, where it settled with Argentina and Canada, but is 
still negotiating with the United States some five years after expiration of the reasonable period of 
time. Finally, in the Bed-Linen case, the European Union was found not to have complied in an Article 
21.5 proceeding; it revoked the duty some eight months after that finding (or one year, four months 
after the expiration of the reasonable period of time). Thus, the only continuing case of contested 
compliance is with the United States in the Biotech case. 
 
EU Implementation In All WTO Cases 
Where RPT Has Expired 
Timely implementation 13 
More than one year late 4 
 
Overall, the EU record of compliance is generally very good, the Bananas and Hormones cases 
excepted. 
D. Conclusion 
Overall, I think that the WTO dispute settlement system has done a credible job in controlling the 
trade actions of the two major players: the United States and the European Union. By and large, they 
have complied with adverse WTO rulings, although not at all promptly at times. For the future, I think 
that the critical test for the WTO dispute settlement system will be whether it is able to deal with the 
increasing number of disputes involving the United States and/or European Union on one side and 
China on the other. While such cases through 2012 had been resolved more or less satisfactorily (see 
China’s implementation record to date in Annex IV), it is too early to draw any firm conclusions as to 
whether the system will be able to handle these disputes as effectively as it has tended to handle 
US/EU disputes. Of course, in the years ahead, similar issues may arise in respect of Russia if it 
becomes a major participant in the dispute settlement system. 
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Annex I 
Description of Major Controversial WTO Cases in 1995-1999 Period
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EC Bananas.  The Bananas cases (DS27) involved a challenge by the United States, Ecuador 
Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico to the EU-wide regime for banana imports that had replaced EU 
Member State regimes in 1993.  It provided tariff and quota preferences to the ACP countries (Asian, 
Caribbean and Pacific countries, who were parties to the EU’s Lomé Convention, which was designed 
to provide preferential treatment to former colonies of EU members) and quota preferences to certain 
Latin American countries (the so-called Banana Framework countries – Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Nicaragua and Venezuela).  It also set up a complex system of allocating import licenses that favored 
European companies over US and other non-EU companies that had traditionally supplied the EU 
banana market.  There had been two cases in GATT – one successfully challenging the Member States 
regimes (EEC – Member States’ Import Regimes for Bananas, DS32/R, 3 June 1993) and one 
successfully challenging the EU-wide regime (EEC – Import Regime for Bananas, DS38/R, 18 
January 1994), but neither report had been adopted by the GATT Council. The case was particularly 
difficult for the European Union because the banana import regime had involved very difficult 
compromises by the member states – some of which had enjoyed tariff-free or low-tariff bananas for 
decades and wanted that to continue (Germany and many northern countries), while others wanted to 
support producers in former colonies or overseas possessions by giving them preferential treatment in 
the EU market (particularly France, Spain and the United Kingdom). 
EC Hormones.  The Hormones case (DS26; DS48) involved a US and Canadian challenge to an EU 
ban on the importation of meat from beef cattle that had been treated with growth-promoting 
hormones.  It had been subject of much discussion in the GATT Council and in the GATT Standards 
Code Committee in the late 1980’s, where a panel had been established but never composed.  GATT, 
GATT Activities 1987, at 80; GATT, GATT Activities 1988, at 72-74; GATT, GATT Activities 1989, 
at 123. 
Japan Film.  The Film case (DS44) symbolized the US government’s long quest to open Japanese 
markets to US products and was pressed by a US firm – Kodak, which claimed that Japan had 
implemented a number of measures to nullify or impair the benefits that were expected to result from 
Japan’s tariff and quota liberalization actions in the 1960’s and 1970’s.  The case was colloquially 
known as the Kodak-Fuji case.  It was largely based on a non-violation claim – a form of claim 
permitted by GATT, but one that has long been controversial since no violation of any agreement is 
alleged.  Only one such claim has succeeded since the early 1950’s.  John H. Jackson, William J. 
Davey & Alan O. Sykes, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations 287-288 (2002). 
US Shrimp.  The Shrimp-Turtle case (DS56) involved a challenge by a number of developing 
countries – India, Thailand, Malaysia and Pakistan – to US rules that, for the most part, permitted 
shrimp imports only from countries that had adopted US rules and practices with respect to protecting 
turtles in connection with shrimp fishing through the use of so-called turtle excluder devices that allow 
turtles to escape from the shrimp nets.  It involved the same issues of US “environmental 
unilateralism” under the Marine Mammal Protection Act that had been controversial in the unadopted 
GATT Tuna-Dolphin panel reports.  United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R ( 3 
September 1991) & DS29/R (20 May 1994).  It was the Tuna-Dolphin case, more than any other event 
or action, that first made the GATT system widely controversial: “While the [1990 proposal for] 
NAFTA drew attention to the trade and environment issue, a 1991 GATT panel decision on US-
Mexican tuna trade turned that interest into fury.”  Daniel C. Esty, Greening the GATT: Trade, 
Environment, and the Future 29 (1994). 
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US Helms Burton.  The Helms-Burton case (DS38) involved an EU challenge to a US law that 
provided for treble damage actions against foreign entities investing in confiscated US (including 
Cuban-American) assets in Cuba and required the denial of US visas to individuals connected with 
those entities.  The case symbolized the EU’s longstanding complaints about US unilateralism and 
attempts to apply US law extraterritorially. The law had been sponsored by a powerful US Senator – 
Jesse Helms. 
Turkey Textiles.  The Turkey Textiles case (DS34), which was brought by India, presented the 
question of whether the compatibility of a customs union or free trade area with GATT Article XXIV 
could be considered by a dispute settlement panel, an issue that had been controversial in unadopted 
GATT panel reports.  See, e.g., EEC – Tariff Treatment of Citrus Products from Certain 
Mediterranean Countries, L/5776 (7 February 1985).  The Turkey Textiles case involved the EC-
Turkish Customs Union. 
India Quantitative Restrictions.  The India Quantitative Restrictions case (DS90) brought by the 
United States involved the question of whether the dispute settlement system or only the General 
Council and WTO Balance-of-Payments Committee could consider the issue of the justification of 
measures imposed for balance-of-payments reasons under GATT Articles XII & XVIIIB.  The issue 
had been considered, but arguably had not been settled definitively, in Korea – Restrictions on Imports 
of Beef, BISD 36S/202, 234 & 268, adopted on 7 November 1989. 
US Section 301.  The Section 301 case (DS152) involved a challenge by the European Union to the 
basic US statute – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 – under which US authorities had taken 
unilateral action against various foreign laws and regulations that they considered objectionable.  One 
of the goals of a number of countries in the adopting the WTO dispute settlement system was to rein in 
US use of this law.  See DSU, art. 23. 
US Foreign Sales Corporations. The Foreign Sales Corporation case (DS108) involved an EU 
challenge to US tax rules that allegedly provided an export subsidy.  The FSC rules replaced rules 
found to be GATT-inconsistent in the Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC) case.  US Tax 
Legislation (DISC), BISD 23S/98, adopted on 7-8 December 1981. Some thought that the European 
Union resurrected what the  United States supposedly viewed as a settled dispute as a counteraction to 
the US prosecution of the Bananas and Hormones cases, with the thought that US implementation 
would be difficult since the US Congress would have to change corporate tax breaks.  
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Annex II 
The US Implementation Record, as of 31 December 2012 








24-Underwear 25 Feb 97 None Challenged measure expired 28 Mar 97; WT/DSB/M/31 (10 Apr 97); accepted 0 
33-Wool Shirts 23 May 97 None Challenged measure expired 3 Dec 96; accepted 0 
166-Wheat Gluten 19 Jan 01 2 Jun 01 Challenged measure expired 1 Jun 01, as did EU countermeasure; BNA ITD, 5 Jun 01 0 
177-Lamb 16 May 01 None formally Challenged measure expired 15 Nov 01; accepted as timely; WT/DSB/M/113 (21 Nov 01) 0 
192-Yarn 5 Nov 01 None Challenged measure expired 9 Nov 01; WT/DSB/M/113 (21 Nov 01) 0 
202-Line Pipe 8 Mar 02 1 Sep 02 Challenged measure expired 1 Mar 03; complainant (Korea) agree to accept expanded quota 
access as compensation for six month delay; WT/DS202/18 (31 Jul 02) 
6m* 
248-Steel Safeguard 10 Dec 03 None Challenged measure terminated 4 Dec 03; WT/DSB/M/160 0 
Antidumping and Countervail Cases 
99-DRAMS (Korea) 19 Mar 99 19 Nov 99 Compliance challenged 11m 
99-DRAMS (Korea)21.5 X X Panel report noted settlement; settled 20 Oct 00; WT/DS99/12 (25 Oct 00) 
136-1916 Act 26 Sep 00 31 Dec 01 (ext) Act repealed 3 Dec 04; WT/DSB/M/180 (17 Dec 04) 2y/11m 
138-Lead & Bismuth 7 Jun 00 None Measure had been terminated as of 14 Mar 00; WT/DSB/M/85 ( 5 Jul 00) 0 
179-Stainless (Korea) 1 Feb 01 1 Sep 01 Measure revised as of 28 Aug 01, compliance accepted; WT/DSB/M/109 (10 Sep 01) 0 
184-Hot Rolled Steel 23 Aug 01 31 Jul 05 (ext) Challenged AD measure revised 22 Nov 02, compliance accepted; WT/DSB/M/137 (28 Nov 02); 
AD statute unchanged 
7y/5m+ 
206- Steel Plate (India) 29 July 02 31 Jan 03 (ext) Measure revised 7 Feb 03; compliance questioned but not pursued; WT/DSB/M/143 (19 Feb 03) 1w 
212-CVD (EC) 8 Jan 03 8 Nov 03 Measures revised 24 Oct 03; compliance challenged 2y/7m 
212-CVD (EC) 21.5 27 Sep 05 X Measures revised 26 May 06; compliance questioned, not pursued; WT/DSB/M/215(19 Jun 06) 
213-Carbon Steel 19 Dec 02 None Measure revoked 1 Apr 04; WT/DSB/M/167 (20 Apr 04) 0 
217 -Byrd 27 Jan 03 27 Dec 03 Measure repealed in Feb 06 effective as of 30 Sep 07; but duties collected as that date continue 
to be distributed; WT/DSB/M/205 (17 Feb 06); EU and Japan continue retaliation 
9y+ 
236-Lumber III 1 Nov 02 None Challenged (provisional) CVD measure no longer in force as of 25 Mar 02 final measure  0 
257-Lumber IV 17 Feb 04 17 Dec 04 Challenged (final) CVD measure revised 10 Dec 04 - compliance challenged 1y/9m 
257-Lumber IV 21.5 20 Dec 05 X Non-compliance found; settled 12 Sep 06; WT/DS257/26 
264-Lumber V 13 Aug 04 2 May 05 (ext) Challenged AD measure revised 27 Apr 05; WT/DSB/M/189 (19 May 05); compliance challenged 1y/4m 
264-Lumber V 21.5 1 Sep 06 X Non-compliance found; settled 12 Sep 06; WT/DS264/29 
268-OCTG (Argentina) 17 Dec 04 17 Dec 05 Challenged measure revised 16 Dec 05; WT/DSB/M/202 (20 Dec 05); compliance challenged 1y/6m 
268-OCTG (Argen) 21.5 11 May 07 X Non-compliance found; measure revoked 22 Jun 07; 72 FR 34442, effective 25 Jul 06 
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277-Lumber VI 26 Apr 04 26 Jan 05 Challenged measure revised Nov/Dec 04; WT/DSB/M/182 (25 Jan 05); compliance challenged 0 
277-Lumber VI 21.5 9 May 06 X Inconclusive 21.5 challenge; settled 12 Sep 06; WT/DS277/20 
282-OCTG (Mexico) 28 Nov 05 28 May 06 Non-action challenged 1y/4m 
282-OCTG (Mex) 21.5 X X Compliance panel suspended 5 Jul 07; measure revoked 1 Oct 07;72 FR 55747;effective 11 Aug 00 
294-Zeroing (EC) 9 May 06 9 Apr 07 Zeroing case; compliance challenged 4y/10m 
294-Zeroing (EC) 21.5 11 Jun 09 X Non-compliance found; provisionally settled 6 Feb 12; WT/DS294/43; retaliation request 
withdrawn 2 Jul 12; WT/DS294/46 
296-DRAMS (Korea) 20 Jul 05 8 Mar 06 Challenged measure reaffirmed 8 Mar 06; compliance questioned but not pursued; 
WT/DSB/M/206 (14 Mar 06) 
0 
322-Zeroing (J)  23 Jan 07 24 Dec 07 Zeroing case; compliance challenged 4y/1m 
322-Zeroing (J) 21.5 31 Aug 09 X Non-compliance found; provisionally settled 6 Feb 12; WT/DS322/44; retaliation request 
withdrawn 3 Aug 12; WT/DS322/46 
335-Shrimp (Ecuador) 20 Feb 07 20 Aug 07 Challenged measure revoked eff. 15 Aug 07; compliance accepted; WT/DSB/M/238 (31 Aug 07) 0 
344-Stainless (Mexico) 20 May 08 30 Apr 09 Zeroing case; compliance challenged ? 
344-Stainless (Mex) 
21.5 
  21.5 panel suspended as of 27 Apr 12; WT/DS344/23, 24 & 25 
346-Customs Bond 1 Aug 08 1 Apr 09 Challenged measure revoked 1 Apr 09; WT/DSB/M/267 0 
350-Contin’d Zero(EC) 19 Feb 09 19 Dec 09 Zeroing case; provisionally settled 6 Feb 12; WT/DS350/20 2y/2m 
379-CVD/AD (China) 25 Mar 11 25 Apr 12 (ext) Challenged measure revised 21 Aug 12; compliance disputed, but not challenged WT/DSB/M/321 
(31 Aug 12). Panel established in new case by China on similar issues-DS437 
4m 
382-OJ (Brazil) 7 Jun 11 17 Mar 12 AD order revoked; WT/DSB/M/315 (24 Apr 12); compliance not accepted re past zeroing 9m+ 
383-Bags (Thailand) 18 Feb 10 18 Aug 10 Challenged measures revised 28 Jul 10; compliance accepted; WT/DSB/M/286 (31 Aug 10) 0 
402-Zeroing (Korea) 24 Feb 11 24 Oct 11 Challenged measures revised within RPTs; compliance accepted; WT/DSB/M/308 (19 Dec 11) 0 
404-Shrimp (Vietnam) 2 Sep 11 2 Jul 12 Zeroing case; no action as of 31 Dec 12, although US has agreed to stop zeroing 6m+ 
422-Sawblades (China) 23 Jul 12 23 Mar 13 RPT not expired ? 
Subsidy Cases 
108-FSC 20 Mar 00 1 Nov 00 (ext) Compliance challenged 6y/1m 
108-FSC 21.5 I 29 Jan 02 X First measure found non-compliant 
108-FSC 21.5 II 14 Mar 06 X Second measure found non-compliant; implementation as of 31 Dec 06; Pub L 109-222, s 513 
267-Cotton 21 Mar 05 21 Sep 05 Compliance challenged 7y/3m+* 
267-Cotton 21.5 20 Jun 08 X Non-compliance found; “compensation” agreement as of [25 Aug 10] 
353-Civil Aircraft 23 Mar 12 23 Sep 12 Compliance challenged ? 
353-Civil Aircraft 21.5 Pending   
Health, Environment, Consumer Protection Cases 
2-Gasoline 20 May 96 20 Sep 97 On 19 Aug 97, the US revised its rules for imported conventional gasoline; the different rules for 
imported reformulated gasoline were due to expire 1 January 1998; WT/DSB/M/37 (25 Sep 97); 
no further discussion in DSB 
3m/10d 
58-Shrimp 6 Nov 98 6 Dec 99 New guidelines 8 Jul 99 + other actions later; compliance challenged 12 Oct 00 0 
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58-Shrimp 21.5 21 Nov 01  Compliance found 
381-Tuna (Mexico)  13 Jun 12 13 Jul 13 RPT not expired ? 
384-COOL 23 Jul 12 23 May 13 RPT not expired ? 
406-Clove Cigarettes 24 Apr 12 24 Jul 13 RPT not expired ? 
TRIPS Cases 
160-Section 110(5) 27 Jul 00 31 Dec 01 (ext) Not implemented; three-year compensation agreement 11y+* 
176-Section 211 2 Jan 02 30 Jun 05 (ext) Not implemented 7y/6m+ 
Other Cases 
165-Certain EC Prods 10 Jan 01 None Challenged measure had expired on 19 Apr 99; WT/DSB/M/96 (10 Jan 01) 0 
285-Gambling 20 Apr 05 3 Apr 06 Non-action challenged as non-compliant 6y/9m+ 
285-Gambling 21.5 22 May 07 X Non-compliance found; GATS commitment at issue re-negotiated with all interested members, 
except complainant – Antigua; BNA ITD, 17 Mar 08 
392-Poultry (China) 25 Oct 10 None Challenged measure had expired in 2009; WT/DSB/M/288 (25 Oct 10) 0 
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Annex III 
The EU Implementation Record 




Implementation Action and Comment Time in 
excess 
 
Antidumping and Countervail Cases 
141-Bed Linen (India) 12 Mar 01 14 Aug 01 Challenged measure revised 14 Aug 01; WT/DSB/M/108 (23 Aug 01); compliance challenged 1y/4m 
141-Bed Linen 21.5 24 Apr 03 X Non-compliance found; measure terminated 20 Dec 03; G/ADP/N/113/EEC (8 Mar 04) 
219-Tubes (Brazil) 18 Aug 03 19 Mar 04 Challenged measure revised 8 Mar 04; WT/DS219/13; questioned, but not pursued; 
WT/DSB/M/167 (20 Apr 04) 
0 
299-DRAMS (Korea) 3 Aug 05 3 Apr 06 Challenged measure revised 13 Apr 06; WT/DS299/9; questioned, but not pursued; 
WT/DSB/M/210 (21 Apr 06) 
10d 
337-Salmon (Norway) 15 Jan 08 15 Nov 08 Challenged measure revoked 20 Jul 08; WT/DSB/M/254  (1 Aug 08) 0 
397-Fasteners (China) 28 Jul 11 12 Oct 12 Challenged measure revised 4 Oct 12; WT/DS397/15/Add.3; questioned, but not pursued; 
WT/DSB/M/?? (23 Oct 12) 
0 
405-Footwear (China) 22 Feb 12 10 Oct 12 Challenged measure revised 3 Sep 12; WT/DS405/9; questioned, but not pursued; WT/DSB/M/?? 
(17 Dec 12) 
0 
Health, Environment & Consumer Protection Cases 
26-Hormones (US) 13 Feb 98 13 May 99 Non-compliance admitted; retaliation imposed; unsuccessfully challenged in DS320; settled 13 
May 09; WT/DS26/28 
10y 
48-Hormones (Canada) 13 Feb 98 13 May 99 Non-compliance admitted; retaliation imposed; unsuccessfully challenged in DS321; settled 17 
Mar 11; WT/DS48/26 
11y/10m 
174-Geo Indications 20 Apr 05 3 Apr 06 Challenge measure revised 31 Mar 06; questioned, but not pursued; WT/DSB/M/210 (21 Apr 06) 0 
231-Sardines 23 Oct 02 1 Jul 03 (ext) Challenged measure revised 1 Jul 03; mutually agreed solution; WT/DS231/18 0 
291-Biotech 21 Nov 06 11 Jan 08 (ext) Settled with Canada/Argentina, but not US; negotiations continue; art. 22 request suspended 5y+ 
Agriculture Cases 
27-Bananas 25 Sep 97 1 Jan 99 Multiple compliance proceedings; mutually agreed solution 27 Oct 12; WT/DS27/98 13y/10m 
69-Poultry 23 Jul 98 31 Mar 99 ?? – no discussion in DSB ? 
265-Sugar 19 May 05 22 May 06 Challenged measure revised 19 May 06; WT/DS265/35/Add.1; questioned in DSB ever since (e.g., 
WT/DSB/M/311 (20 Jan 12)), but not pursued in dispute settlement 
0 
269-Chicken Cuts 27 Sep  05 27 Jun 06 Challenged measure revised 27 Jun 06; questioned, but not pursued; WT/DSB/M/217  (19 Jul 06) 0 
Other Cases 
246-Tariff Preferences 20 Apr 04 1 Jul 05 Challenged measure revised 27 Jun 06; questioned, but not pursued; WT/DSB/M/194 (20 Jul 05) 0 
301-Commercial Vessels 20 Jun 05 None Challenged measure expired 31 Mar 05; WT/DSB/M/194 (20 Jul 05) 0 
315-Customs  11 Dec 06 None Compliance claimed 11 Dec 06; WT/DSB/M/233 (11 Dec 06) 0 
316-Civil Air 1 Jun 11 1 Dec 11 Compliance challenged ? 
316-Civil Air 21.5 Pending   
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Annex IV 
The Chinese Implementation Record, as of 31 December 2012 
 




Implementation Action and Comment Time in 
excess 
 
339-Auto Parts 12 Jan 09 1 Sep 09 Compliance claimed 1 Sep 09; WT/DSB/M/273 0 
362-IP Rights 20 Mar 09 20 Mar 10 Compliance claimed 1 Apr 09; WT/DSB/M/282; questioned, not pursued 12d 
363-Audiovisual  19 Jan 10 19 Mar 11 MOU signed in Feb 12; WT/DS363/19; China claims compliance; US questions, not yet pursued 1y? 
394-Raw Materials 22 Feb 12 31 Dec 12 Compliance claimed 31 Dec 12; WT/DSB/M/---; questioned, not yet pursued 0 
413-Payment Systems 31 Aug 12 31 Jul 13 Pending ? 
414-GOES AD/CVD 16 Nov 12 In arbitration  ? 
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